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Increases in  corporate debt  in  a  variety  of  countries over the past  decade have 
renewed interest in the relationship between leverage and the macro-economy.  In 
general, the theoretical work  on these  links has  outpaced the empirical research. 
This paper is an initial attempt to examine changes in corporate fmancial structure in 
Australia over .the past two decades. It  explores the evolution of debt-asset ratios, 
interest cover ratios, dividend pay-out  ratios and  the  ratio of trade  credit to total 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Increases in  corporate  debt  over  the  past  decade  have  increased  interest  in  the 
determinants of corporate financial structure and the relationship between financial 
structure and the business cycle'.  This increased interest follows a period in which 
issues related to corporate financial structure received little attention.  On the micro- 
economic  front,  this  lack  of  attention  was  due,  in  large  part,  to  the  work  by 
Modigliani  and  Miller  (1958).  They  argued  that,  under  certain  conditions,  the 
optimal financial structure of the firm is indeterminate and should not influence the 
fm's  real decisions.  On the macro-economic front, there was little interest in  the 
relationship between corporate finance and the business cycle following the work of 
Friedman and  Schwartz (1963).  Their results on  the correlations between  output 
and money led to a preoccupation with money as the financial factor responsible for 
the business cycle. 
The  view  that  financial  structure  does  not  matter  has  recently  come  under 
considerable attack.  This, in part, reflects concern over the macro-economic effects 
of the  increase  in  corporate leverage  that  occurred  in  a wide range  of  countries 
during the  1980s.  There have  also been considerable advances at  the  theoretical 
level.  In particular, models emphasising management incentives and principal-agent 
problems have formalised links between financial stnicture and economic activity2. 
Whlle  there  has  been  considerable  empirical  exploration  of  the  links  between 
financial structure and the business cycle in  the United States, there has been little 
work done using Australian data.  This paper is a first step towards filling the gap. 
It uses a recently constructed database to examine changes in  the financial structure 
See Stevens (1991)  and  Dempster, Howe and  Lekawski  (1990)  for earlier discussions of  the 
rise in leverage in  Australia. 
2  Gertler (1988) provides a usefbl summary of this work. of Australian firms over the past two decades.  The database consists of financial 
statement data for 224 firms over the period  1973 to  1990.  The data derives from 
records  kept  by  the  Reserve  Bank  of  Australia  as part  of  its  production  of  the 
Company Finance Supplement.  In turn, the Reserve Bank of Australia's records are 
based  on data published  by  the Australian  Stock Exchange  and  data  supplied by 
firms to State Corporate Affairs B~ueaux. 
The paper has  two specific goals.  The first  goal  is  to  document  changes  in the 
structure of  corporate balance  sheets and  financing behaviour  over the  past  two 
decades.  We examine changes in  the leverage of fms,  their interest cover, their 
dividend payment policy and their reliance on creditors3 as a source of debt finance. 
The second-goal  of the paper is to examine the variation in financial structure within 
different  industries.  In  particular,  we  explore  the  issue  of  whether  changes  in 
Gnancial structure have been concentrated in industries that are particularly sensitive 
to the business cycle. 
While changes in the average leverage of firms may have important implications for 
the behaviour of the economy in response to a particular shock, it  is also important 
to .examine the distribution of leverage across finns.  For example,  the extent to 
which the macro-economy becomes more vulnerable to shocks, following increased 
indebtedness of the corporate sector, is likely to depend on the characteristics of the 
firms whose leverage rose.  Increases in  the debt-asset ratios of firms with stable 
cash flows could be expected to have less adverse effects than increases in the debt- 
asset ratios of firms with volatile cash flows.  Similarly, the ability of the economy 
to  rebound  quickly  from  a  recessioil  may  be  adversely  affected  if  increases  in 
leverage are concentrated in firms that have highly cyclical output.  For such firms, 
an  economic  downturn  causes  a  significant deterioration  in  their  ability to  meet 
current  obligations out  of current  earnings.  This may  make  it  more  difficult for 
these  firms  to  finance  positive  net  value  projects  and  may  make  risk-averse 
management  unwilling  to  undertake  risky  investments.  The  result  is  a  deeper 
recession and a slower recovery than would have been the case had  leverage been 
lower.  Lowe and Rohling (1993) discuss this issue in more detail. 
3  "Creditors" is  defined as the sum of "trade creditors" and  "other creditors" as reported in  the 
Company Review Service. In this paper, changes in the distribution of leverage across firms are explored using 
two different methods.  First, for each year, we rank the firms by their leverage and 
then  observe  the  leverage  at  specific percentiles  of the  distribution.  We then 
examine changes in those percentiles  over time.  Applying the alternative method, 
we rank industries based upon the degree of volatility or cyclicality of their output 
and  profitability.  We  then  examine  the  relationship  between  the  degree  of 
cyclicality/volatility and the changes in  leverage of the firms  in  particular industry 
groups.  These techniques are also applied to the other ratios that have been used to 
describe financial structure. 
The results  in  this  paper  indicate  that  leverage  increased strongly tluoughout  the 
1980s, after having remained fairly constant during the 1970s.  It shows that, at least 
until  1987, the  increase  was widespread  tluoughout  the  corporate  sector.  From 
1987 onwards, however, ,the majority of firms reduced or maintained their level of 
gearing.  Of the  firms  that  did  continue  with  strong debt  expansion, most  were 
already highly geared4.  Associated with the generalised increase in  leverage during 
1980s was an accelerated growth rate of firms' balance sheets.  However, earnings 
growth  did  not  fully cover the  increased  interest burden  generated by  the  rise  in 
debt.  As a result, interest cover was much lower in the 1980s than in the 1970s. 
Finally, the  study of financial structure by  industry  shows that  the rise in  leverage 
was a characteristic of all industries, regardless of the degree of their volatility  or 
cyclicality.  However,  the  extent  of  the  financial  structure  adjustment  differed 
considerably  across  the  industries  examined.  The  results  suggest  that  the 
adjustment  was relatively  pronounced  in  the manufacturing sector that is also the 
most  cyclically sensitive sector examined. In  contrast, the  less cyclically sensitive 
retail  and  services sectors  experienced  smaller increases  in  leverage.  They  did, 
however, have higher initial leverage than did the manufacturing sector. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  describes  the 
database, defines the ratios examined in  the paper and explains the statistics used to 
-  --  - 
Extending the database to include data for 1991, a subsample of 66 firms showed a continuation 
of this pattern.  Many firms appeared  to be  reducing their  leverage  while  others  experienced 
increased  leverage.  The limited  data available for  1992 suggests that,  during  1991/92,  more 
significant and generalised reconstruction took place. 4 
summarise movements of the ratios.  Section 3 then discusses the evolution of the 
ratios over time and  examines changes in  the frequency distributions of the ratios. 
In Section 4, the relationship between cyclicality and volatility on the one hand and 
changes  in  financial  stnicture  on  the  other,  is  examined.  Finally,  Section  5 
summarises and concludes. 
2.  THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1.  The Data base 
The financial statements for a sample of 224 companies have been collected, where 
available, for tlze period ninning froin  1973 to  1990 inclusive.  The data from  1973 
to 1986 was obtained from records used in the compilation of the Company Review 
Supplement published  by  the  Reserve Bank  of Australia until  April  1988.  The 
original sources for the Company Review Supplement were the Company Review 
Service published by the A~lstralian  Stock Exchange and annual reports released by 
the  individual  companies.  The  annual  reports  were  only  used  for  unlisted 
companies.  For tlze  period  from  1987 to  1990, the database had  to  be  extended 
using the Company Review Supplelne~lt  sources directly. 
For each company, in each year, the balance sheet and the profit and loss statement 
were surnmarised  into  a  standard  form.  The  number  of  companies  that  existed 
throughout the sample period is 1 10. Of the 114 for which incomplete data exist, 22 
companies  commenced  operations  after  1973,  while  the  remainder  ceased 
independent operations  prior  to  1990.  Appendix  1 lists  all  companies;  asterisks 
mark those with  incomplete data.  The remainder of the paper  uses  the  constant 
sample of 110 firms although Appendix 2 presents selected results using data from 
all 224 fms5. 
In  1989190, the total assets of our sample of 110 firms equalled $207 billion.  In comparison, 
the aggregate liabilities and equity for the combined private  corporate trading  enterprises (from 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics Flow of Funds) was $437 billion  in  1989190.  This figure of 
$437 billion excludes intra-sector liabilities and thus understates the true total assets of the sector. 
Also in  1989190 aggregate earnings before interest payments and taxation (EBIT)  is  $22 billion 
for our sample of firms which compares to the National  Accounts net  operating surplus of $45 
billion in 1989190. (Net operating surplus is defined as income after depreciation.) Not  all  companies  share the  same reporting  date and, on  occasions,  companies 
change their reporting dates.  On average, slightly more than half of the companies 
have a reporting date in the June quarter.  The bulk of these report as at the end of 
June.  Over a quarter of fms  report as at the end of December with the remaining 
companies reporting at various times throughout the year.  These various reporting 
dates make it difficult to line up the yearly figures with year to year movements in 
macro-economic variables.  When comparing changes in  financial behaviour with 
developments in the macro-economy, we generally treat the figure for a particular 
year as representing the end of the financial year. 
2.2.  The Ratios 
In this paper we examine four key ratios calculated from firms' financial statements. 
These ratios are the debt-asset ratio, the interest cover ratio, the dividend  pay-out 
ratio and the ratio of creditors to total debt. 
The debt-asset ratio is defined as the net liabilities of the firm divided by  its total 
assets (A)  where net liabilities are equal to total assets less shareholders' filnds (E). 
That is, the debt-asset ratio @/A) is given by: 
D  A-E  - = - 
A  A 
Included  in  debt are all non-equity  sources of finance.  This definition of debt is 
quite broad.  It includes both interest bearing and non-interest  bearing debt.  This 
ratio is  often referred  to  as a  measure of gearing or leverage,  Another  popular 
measure of leverage is the ratio of debt to equity.  In this paper we use the debt to 
assets ratio as our measure of leverage principally because it bounded between zero 
and one (for fms  with non-negative  equity).  In  contrast, the debt-equity ratio  is 
bounded between zero and infinity.  If equity is relatively low, then small changes in 
equity will lead to large changes in the debt-equity  ratio.  This may make it  more 
difficult to detect important economic changes.  The debt-asset ratio is much less 
sensitive to small changes in equity and allows a more straightforward presentation 
of the data. 
The interest  cover ratio  (C)  is  defined  as  gross  profits  (n)  divided  by  interest 
payments (I).  That is: Gross profits  are equal to profits  before interest,  depreciation  and tax have  been 
deducted.  The interest cover ratio represents the number of times that interest can 
be paid out of gross profits.  The ratio can range between plus and minus infiity. 
Sustained deterioration in interest cover makes the firm more vulnerable to earnings 
shocks.  Unlike dividends, interest payments must be made regardless of the fm's 
operating profits.  Given  a  constant  volatility  of  operating  profits,  the  lower  is 
interest cover, the higher is the probability that the firm will be unable to meet its 
interest obligations out of current profits. 
The third ratio that we examine is the dividend pay-out ratio. It  is defined as total 
dividends divided by  net profits.  Total dividends include both ordinary dividends 
(Do) and preference dividends (Dp).  Net  profits are defined as gross profits  less 
interest payments (I), tax (T) and depreciation (d).  Thus, 
Pay-Out Ratio  =  41  +D~ 
7T-I-T-d 
One minus the dividend pay-out ratio gives the share of net profits that are retained 
by the fm. For many firms, these retained earnings are a major source of equity 
fiance.  Changes in  the pay-out  ratio reflect a variety of factors,  amongst which 
taxation changes are perhaps the most important.  Changes in the pay-out ratio by a 
firm  may also reflect a desire to  change the current  share of debt  on its balance 
sheet.  For example, if a firm wishes to lower its debt-asset ratio or to improve its 
interest cover, it may elect to retain a higher proportion of its earnings than would 
otherwise be the case.  For some firms retained earnings may be a more effective 
method of achieving balance sheet reconstniction than raising new equity directly. 
The  ratio  of  "trade  creditors"  plus  "other  creditors"  to  total  debt  indicates  the 
relative  importance  of  credit  extended  tllrough  sources  other  than  financial 
intermediaries.  The creditors to debt ratio shows how the increased availability of 
credit  from financial institutions  has  impacted upon  the usage  of trade  credit  by 
fms.  A-priori,  one  would  expect  trade  creditors  to  become  less  important  as 
financial liberalisation occurred. It is a difficult task to summarise each of the ratios for all of the firms in  a set of 
simple summary statistics.  Amongst other alternatives, it is possible to use a simple 
average of the individual ratios, to take some form of weighted average or to use the 
median.  Each statistic has its own advantages and disadvantages.  We have chosen 
to examine a weighted average for each of the ratios across the individual  firms. 
Using simple averages can lead to considerable volatility in the summary statistics 
when the individual ratios can take values approaching infinity.  For example, if a 
fm  has no  debt then its interest  cover ratio is infinite and the average across all 
fms  becomes undefined.  In calculating the weighted averages, each firm's ratio is 
weighted by the fms  share in the sum of the individual firms' ratio denominators, 
For example, the weight for each firm in the debt to asset ratio is the firm's share of 
total assets. 
It  is possible that, in some cases, changing the weights could alter, in an important 
way, the behaviour of the average ratio.  To ensure that our results are not driven by 
changes in just  a  few  firms  we  also present  graphs  that  show ,the "across firm" 
distribution of ratios.  In particular, we graph the ratios for the  loth, 25th, 50th (the 
median),  75th  and  90th percentiles  of the  distribution.  This  also  allows  some 
examination of whether changes in the weighted average reflect developments that 
are  common  to  all  firms  or  simply  reflect  large  changes  in  small  parts  of  the 
distribution. 
3.  BEHAVIOUR OF THE FINANCIAL RATIOS 
3.1.  Debt-Asset Ratio 
Graph  1 presents  the weighted  average debt-asset ratio  between  1973 and  1990. 
The  time  profiles  of  the  loth,  25th,  50th,  75th  and  90th  percentiles  of  the 
distribution of the ratio are presented in Graph 2.  These graphs show that the ratio 
of debt to assets increased substantially during the  1980s after remaining relatively 
constant over the 1970s. In  1973, for our sample of finns, debt financed an average 
of  52 percent  of fums'  total  assets.  By  1980, this  share had  actually  declined 
slightly to 51 percent.  In  contrast, the  1980s saw the sliare of debt  on corporate 
balance sheets increase, with debt accounting for almost two-thirds of total assets in 8 
Graph 1: Weighted Average Debt-Asset Ratio 
Graph 2: Debt-Asset Ratio Percentiles 9 
1989 and 1990.  The percentiles of the leverage distribution show ,that the increase 
in the average ratio of debt to assets cannot be accounted for by  an increase in the 
leverage of  a minority  of  large or highly  levered firms.  All  percentiles show an 
increase in leverage over the 1980s. 
These  frndings  match  those  of  Dempster,  Howe  and  Lekawski  (1990),  who 
observed consistent growth in the ratio of gross debt to the book  value of  equity 
between  1981 and  1988.  However, Dempster, Howe  and Lekawski (1990)  also 
considered a measure of leverage based upon a firm's market value.  Specifically, 
they  found that the ratio of interest bearing debt to market  capitalisation had  not 
trended  upwards  over the  1980s.  Unfortunately, given  that  our  sample of  firms 
includes listed and unlisted companies, we are not  able to calculate the aggregate 
market value of the fms  in our sample.  As  a proxy for the market value of firm 
equity, we use the market capitalisation of all firms listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange.  We then calculate a proxy for the aggregate debt equity ratio by dividing 
the total book value of debt for our sample of firms by  our proxy for their market 
capitalisation.  This is presented in  Graph 3.  It shows a similar time profile to the 
Graph 3: Debt Over Market Capitalisation interest  bearing  debt  over  market  value  of  equity  chart  presented  in  Dempster, 
Howe and Lekawski (1990, chart 10).  Our market-value based measure of leverage 
is  significantly  more  volatile  than  our book value  measure  of leverage.  Perhaps 
more  importantly,  it  does  not  show  an  upward  trend  over  the  1980s.  Sharp 
increases in  1982 and 1988 and 1989 were offset by falls between 1982 and 1987. 
If in fact, share prices are always equal to the present discounted value of the future 
stream  of  dividends  and  if  financial  contracts  are  state-contingent  or  financial 
intermediaries  are  risk  neutral  and  far-sighted,  then  the  appropriate  measure  of 
leverage is that based on a firm's market value.  For instance, if a firm discovers a 
new  technology  that  greatly  increases its  expected  filture  profits  then  that  fm's 
market value will rise.  As a result, while leverage based upon the firm's book value 
remains unchanged, leverage based upon the firm's market value falls considerably. 
Given appropriately structured financial contracts, a potential lender should only be 
concerned  with  the  firm's  future  profitability  and  thus  the  market-value  based 
measure of leverage. 
Unfortunately,  we  do  not  live  in  such  an  ideal  world.  There  is  considerable 
evidence that asset prices can deviate fiom fundamentals for long periods of time.  If 
fms  and financial institutions mistake a non-fi~ndarnental  increase in share prices 
for an increase in hture profitability  and then make lending decisions based upon 
this misinterpretation, fms  may become  over-geared.  In  turn,  an increase  in  the 
probability  of  financial  distress  may  result.  In  addition,  when  the  inevitable 
correction to  asset  prices  occurs, finn equity  is Wher reduced  and,  as  a result, 
some  fums  will  fail.  The  deterioration  in  equity  and  losses  by  financial 
intermediaries may generate a sustained period of sluggish economic activity.  Thus, 
when considering the implications of a change in  market-value  based measures of 
leverage, it  is important to consider whether the share price movements are driven 
by rational expectations of changes in the fi1hu-e value of a firm's income strearn or 
simply reflect non-fundamental forces. 
To some extent, the rapid increase in asset prices documented by Macfarlane (1990) 
drove the movements  in  market-value  measures  of leverage over the  1980s.  As 
Macfarlane (1989  page  27)  notes,  the relatively  coilstant  ratio  of debt  to  market 
capitalisation, "does not, of itself contradict the proposition  that there  had been an 
upward  shift in  corporate demand  for debt".  The  increased  access to filnds  that 
accompanied financial liberalisation most probably led to an increase in the value of financial assets.  This increase is likely to have reflected two factors.  The first is 
higher real earnings in response to the removal of some liquidity constraints.  Higher 
earnings should have been translated  into higher filture dividends and thus higher 
current share prices.  Second, the financial liberalisation, and the resulting increase 
in borrowing, facilitated speculative asset purchases that drove up the value of the 
share market.  It is unlikely that all share price movements were driven by changes 
in  expected  future  income  streams  and,  thus,  it  remains  important  to  examine 
changes in the book-value based measures of leverage. 
In general, the ratio of debt to the book value of assets will increase if either equity 
is swapped for debt or if balance sheet growth is financed using a higher share of 
debt than the current share of debt on the balance sheet.  While swaps of debt for 
equity, through management buy-outs, have been popular in the United States, they 
have been relatively rare in  Australia.  Anderson  and  Brooks (1991) report  that, 
before October 1990, there had only been 55 buyouts in Australia, with a combined 
value in excess of two billion dollars.  They attribute the relative lack of leveraged 
buyouts to the reluctance  of Australian managers to move from manager to owner 
status and the unwillingness of institutioilal lenders to support such activity. 
With  these  swaps playing  a  relatively  minor  role  in  changing  the  structure  of 
corporate  balance  sheets,  the  increase  in  debt-asset  ratios  primarily  reflected 
balance sheet expansion using a higher proportion of debt than had previously been 
the  case.  This  increased  reliance  on  debt  was  facilitated  by  the  financial 
liberalisation that took place in the first half of the 1980s.  The removal of controls 
on  interest  rates  increased  access  to  intennediated  credit,  and  the  increased 
competition associated with financial liberalisation  meant that  banks were keen to 
expand their market share by lending.  This aggressive lending allowed corporations 
to expand their balance sheets at a much faster rate in the 1980s than they did in the 
1970s.  The strong growth of firm assets is illustrated in Graph 4  which shows the 
average value of real total assets for the 110 firms in our sample6.  Between  1974 
and  1979 real asset growth of firms averaged  1.6 percent per annum.  In contrast, 
during the  1980s, real  asset  growth  of the  same finns averaged  9.4 percent  per 
annum.  Graph 5 shows the percentiles of the real total assets distribution over time. 
Real  values  were  obtained  by  dividing the book  value  of total  assets for  each  firm by  the 
Consumer Price Index at 1984185 prices, after it had been rebased to 1990. It  clearly  indicates  the  widespread  nature  of  balance  sheet  expansion  over  the 
1980s. 
From Graphs 1 and 2, it  is difficult to distinguish  any strong relationship between 
the degree of leverage and the business cycle.  Changes in fm  leverage appear to 
be  dominated by  trend  components,  with  the  business  cycle  playing  a relatively 
minor role.  There does, however, appear to be some weak link between economic 
activity and leverage arising from the fact that balance sheet expansion is typically 
slower in recessions.  If balance sheet growth  is financed using a higher share of 
debt than the current sl~are  of debt on the balance sheets then slower asset growth 
will see slower growtl~  in leverage.  This is evidenced by the declines in leverage in 
1975 and  1990 and the slower rate of increase in  leverage in  1983.  Each of these 
declines is associated with a reduction in the aggregate real assets of the firms in our 
sample. 
The situation in 1990 is particularly interesting.  T11e  size of the combined nominal 
balance  sheets of ,the firms  in  our sample rose by  only 2.6  percent,  the  smallest 
increase for any year in  our sample.  As Graph 4  shows, the 2.6 percent nominal 
growth represented a decline in the real value of assets of the finns in our sample. 
This  very  slow  nominal  balance  sheet growth was associated  with  a  fall  in  the 
nominal  value  of  debt outstanding.  This can be  seen in  Graph 6 that  shows the 
percentage  change  in  the  aggregate  value  of nominal  assets  and  the  change  in 
nominal debt as a percentage of total assets for the 110 firms studied7.  It shows that 
1990 was the only year in which the value of nominal debt actually fe118.  This fall in 
debt,  coupled  with  slight  growth  in  the  size  of balance  sheets,  meant  that  tlle 
weighted average debt-asset ratio declined slightly in  1990. 
7  It should be noted that we cannot directly match fund sources with fund applications.  Thus, the 
new debt of firms may be used to pay taxation, interest or dividends while their earnings may be 
entirely  used  to  accumulate  assets.  From  an  accounting  perspective,  however,  depreciation 
allowances,  interest,  taxation  are deducted  from  earnings  and  the  remainder  is  viewed  as the 
contribution of earnings to the pool of hnds available for net asset purchases. 
8  This fall in  total  debt  precedes  the  decline in  business  credit which  is  apparent  in  aggregate 
credit statistics.  In large part, this earlier fall reflects a major reduction in  both the total debt and 
the total assets of a single firm in our sample. Graph 4: Average ReaI Total Assets 
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A counter-example to the positive relationship  between balance  sheet growth and 
leverage  is  evident  i11  1980 and  1981  where  strong  balance  sheet  growth  was 
associated with a decline in leverage.  During these years, milling companies raised 
a considerable amount of equity tllrough new share issues.  These equity hnds were 
used  to finance investment  associated with the  "minerals  boom".  The increased 
dependence on equity fiinds during  1980 and  198  1 is illustrated in  Graph 6 which 
shows that,  during these two years, less than half  of the balance sheet expailsion 
was accounted for by the accumulation of new debt. 
While, on balance, there is some evidence that the degree of leverage is a function 
of the business cycle, the relationship appears relatively weak and is dominated by 
other factors.  This, however,  does not  exclude the  possibility  that  leverage has 
some effect on the evolution of the business cycle,  Large increases in  leverage, as 
experienced in the 1980s, may leave the economy more exposed to adverse macro- 
economic shocks.  As Seth (1990 page 6) suggests, "if highly levered fms  are also 
cyclical,  that  is,  if  the  firms'  ability  to  repay  is  directly  related  to  the  level  of 
economic  activity,  there  is  danger of positive  feedback".  Bernanke  and  Gertler 
(1990) reach the same conclusion by noting that high leverage reduces the collateral of fms,  making financial institutions less willing to hnd positive net present value 
investment projects. 
Whether  or  not  an  economy  that  experiences  an  increase  in  leverage  is  more 
susceptible to shocks, depends, in part, upon the type of fms  that are responsible 
for the increase in  leverage.  For example, if firms with  highly cyclical profits  are 
responsible for the increase, the susceptibility of the economy to adverse shocks is 
likely  to be higher than  if firms with  very  stable profits were responsible for  the 
higher  leverage,  If  firms  with  highly  cyclical  profits  increase  leverage,  the 
probability of some form of credit squeeze in a recession increases.  Any such credit 
squeeze  may  prolong  and  intensify the  recession.  The  relationship  between  the 
cyclicality  of output and leverage is  explored  in  Section 4.  However,  it  is  also 
usehl to  examine  changes  in  the  frequency  distribution  of firms'  leverage.  An 
increase in  average corporate debt may stem from  a small  subset of fms  or may 
result from across-the-board leverage increases.  Different scenarios imply different 
consequences for  macro-economic  stability.  We now  explore this  issue in  more 
detail. 
While Graph 1 shows some small decline in the debt-asset ratio between  1973 and 
198  1, the percentiles  in Graph 2 show that this trend is driven by the upper tail of 
the distribution.  The  loth, 25th, 50th and  75th percentiles  all  increased over tlis 
period, while the 90th percentile declined from 0.79 to 0.70.  The reduced role of 
debt for the most highly geared finns coupled with the slight increase in leverage of 
the less highly geared firms meant that  the dispersion of leverage across firms was 
reduced during the  1970s.  From the perspective of the  1980s, however, evolution 
over  the  1970s was  relatively  minor.  In  terms  of the  business  cycle  effect  on 
leverage, a general decline in leverage in  1974175 corresponded to the slowdown in 
activity 111  the same year.  This is evidenced by the decline of all percentiles,  with 
the exception of the 25  th, in Graph 2. 
The increase in corporate leverage between  198  1 and  1987 was widespread; each 
percentile of the distribution increased over this period.  The debt-asset  ratio at the 
10th percentile increased from 0.29 to 0.37 between 198  1 and 1987 while the ratio 
at the 90th percentile increased from 0.70 to 0.83.  The bulk of the increase in the 
10th percentile occurred in the early 1980s.  Increases in the other percentiles  also 
occurred in the early years of the 1980s, however, they were smaller than that of the 
10th percentile, 16 
Most fms  experienced  little or no  firrther  increase  in  leverage  after  1987.  The 
loth, 25th and 75th percentiles actually declined between 1987 and  1990 while the 
median increased marginally.  The debt to  asset ratio  at  the 90th percentile  also 
increased marginally but was considerably more volatile over the four years fiom 
1987 to  1990.  While  fewer firms were increasing their  leverage  after  1987, the 
weighted  average  measure  shows rising  leverage  during  1988 and  1989.  This 
reflects  rapidly  increasing leverage  in  a  small number of firms  in the late  1980s. 
While leverage at the 90th percentile increased by 2.0 percentage points between 
1987 and 1990, the 98th percentile increased by 6.3 percentage points.  In summary, 
the  increasing  weighted  average  debt-asset  ratio  in  1988  and  1989  reflects 
increasing leverage in a small iluinber of outlying firms.  The increase in leverage 
that took place between 1983 and 1987 was, however, more widespread. 
3.2.  Interest Cover Ratio 
The above discussion of the relationship between leverage and the business  cycle 
implicitly assumed that higher leverage increased the riskiness of the firm.  While 
this  assumption  is  true  if  all  other things  are  constant,  higher  leverage  does not 
necessarily  imply  a  higher  probability  of  insolvency  or  corporate  failure.  For 
example, if  interest rates  fall  at the same time  that  leverage  increases, the higher 
leverage may not leave the firm more susceptible to earnings shocks.  Even if higher 
leverage does increase the probability of being unable to meet current commitments 
from  current  earnings,  it  does not  necessarily  imply  an  increased  probability  of 
financial distress.  An  increase  in  leverage may be accompanied  by  a  more long- 
sighted relationship between the firm and the provider of finance. 
Also, when interpreting the effects of iilcreasiilg leverage, it  must be remembered 
that many fms  were adjusting in response to the removal of a credit constraint.  To 
the extent that they were moving fiom a constrained optimum to an unconstrained 
optimum, their increased leverage should be beneficial.  However, if firms overshot 
their new optimal financial structure they  inay have become exposed to undesired 
levels  of  risk.  Notwithstanding  these  qualifications,  one  measure  of  the 
susceptibility of fms  to adverse shocks is the interest cover ratio.  In Section 2 this 
was  defrned  as profits  before  interest,  tax  and  depreciation  divided  by  interest 
payments. Graph 7 shows the weighted average interest cover for the 110 firms in our sample 
and  Graph  8  shows  the  time  profiles  of  the  loth,  25th  50th,  75th  and  90th 
percentiles.  Weighted average interest cover declined substantially between  1973 
and  1990.  Between 1973 and  1980 the interest cover ratio averaged 6.7,  By 1982, 
the ratio had fallen to 4.1 and thereafter it followed a slow decline.  By  1990, the 
weighted average interest cover ratio had reached 3.0.  The percentiles in  Graph 8 
suggest that the decline in interest cover over the 1980s was characteristic of most 
hs. 
The expression for interest cover, given in (2), can be re-expressed as: 
This expression shows interest cover to be a function of tlzree variables: the earnings 
rate on assets (dA), the average interest rate (i) and the debt to asset ratio @/A). 
Ceteris paribus, interest cover declines if the rate of return on  assets declines, or if 
the interest rate or leverage increases.  The debt-asset ratio is presented in Graph  1 
while the weighted average return on  assets for our sample of firms is shown in 
Graph 9.  Graph 7 shows two measures of the interest rate.  The first is the overdraft 
rate on large corporate loans and the second is the sum of the interest payments of 
each firm divided by the suin of the firms' average total debt for each year.  Average 
debt is used  instead of debt as at  the balance date to ameliorate the distortionar-y 
effects of changing debt levels over the financial periodg.  For example, if debt was 
rising  over  the  financial period,  the  interest  rate,  calculated  by  dividing interest 
payments by balance date debt, would underestimate the actual average rate paid. 
9  Average debt  combines the  debt  at  the  beginning  and  end  of the  financial  period  using  an 
arithmetic average. 18 





Graph 8: Interest Cover Ratio Percentiles Graph 9: Weighted Average Earnings-Asset Ratio 
The  average interest  rate  paid  is  less  volatile  than,  and  considerably  below,  the 
overdraft  rate.  Part  of  the  large  difference  between  the  two  "cost  of  funds" 
measures stems fiom the fact that a large share of corporate debt represents  trade 
credit that often attracts low or zero interest payments.  Finns may also borrow at 
fixed rates for long periods of time and thus their borrowing costs are not as volatile 
as  the  interest  rate  on  overdrafts.  Notwithstanding  these  complications,  both 
interest rate series are higher in the 1980s than in the 1970s and both indicate lower 
interest rates in 1984 and 1988, These patterns are in keeping with the evolution of 
interest cover over the sample period. 
The business cycle is a major detenninant of company profits.  When the economy 
is growing strongly, profits  are typically  increasing.  Conversely, in recessions the 
return  on  assets  is  generally  comparatively  low.  This  pro-cyclical  nature  of 
company profits is reflected, at least to some extent, in the interest cover ratio.  The 
buoyant economy in  1973/74 saw profits increase and interest cover rise.  As the 
economy slowed in  1974175, profitability  and interest cover declined.  In  1975 the 
decline in  interest cover was  exacerbated by  an  increase in  interest  rates.  Strong 
profitability in  1979 and  1980, coupled with  a decline in the debt-asset ratio  and 
only a small increase in interest rates, saw interest cover rise again.  These changes in the 1970s were, however, relatively minor compared with those which took place 
in the first half of the 1980s. 
Between 1980 and 1983 average interest cover fell fi-om  7.1 to 3.8 for our sample of 
firms.  This reflected  both  a  significant fall  in  corporate  profitability  and  higher 
interest  rates.  As  the  ecoilollly  recovered  illto  1984,  corporate  profitability 
increased and interest rates declined.  Previous experience would have suggested a 
corresponding substantial increase in the interest cover ratio.  This did not occur.  In 
fact,  interest  cover  continued  to  decline, albeit  at  a  much  slower  pace than  had 
occurred  in  the  early  1980s.  This  decline  reflected  the  significant  increase  in 
leverage that occurred during the first half of the 1980s. The effect on interest cover 
of rising leverage was mitigated to some extent by  an improvement in  the rate  of 
return on corporate assets.  The higher rates of return were, however, insufficient to 
prevent a deterioration in  interest cover.  Graph 7 also confirms that interest rates 
played a role in the deterioration of the interest cover ratio.  Interest rates were, on 
average, considerably  higher  in  the  1980s than  in  the  1970s, making the  burden 
associated  with  any given debt level, significantly higher.  Movements in  interest 
rates over the 1980s also appear to be reflected by the aggregate interest cover ratio; 
lower interest rates 111  1984 and  1988 are matched  by  a higher aggregate interest 
cover ratio. 
In a recent study comparing international trends in  corporate leverage, Seth (1990) 
concluded  that  although  leverage  had  increased  in  Australia  in  the  1980s, the 
corporate  sector  had  not  become  more  fiagile  because  interest  cover  had  not 
declined.  That is, profits had grown in line with the increased debt.  This conclusion 
was based upon a sample covering the period fiom  1982 to  1988.  Over this period 
there was relatively little deterioration  in  interest  cover  compared  to the  declines 
between  1980 and  1982.  However, the starting point (that is,  1982) is in a severe 
recession  when  corporate  profits  were  being  squeezed.  As  was  argued  above, 
interest cover would normally have improved as the economy recovered.  However, 
the  increasing  debt  and  higher  interest  rates  seriously  limited  this  improvement. 
Instead of stabilising at a level comparable to that prevailing in  the 1970s, interest 
cover remained at a traditionally low level.  Contrary to the conclusion reached by 
Seth, the build up in  debt caused a deterioration in  the interest cover of Australian 
fms  and, to some extent, increased their susceptibility to adverse shocks. We now  examine  the  frequency  distribution  of  interest  cover  and  its  evolution 
through time.  As Graph 8 shows, 50 percent of firms had cash flow 8.7 times their 
interest payments in 1973. By 1983 the median interest cover ratio had fallen to 4.0 
times  earnings,  By  1990 the median  had  fallen  oilly  slightly fiirther  to  3.9.  In 
comparison, the 90th percentile was 26.7 in 1973 and 22.7  in both 1983 and 1990. 
Also from Graph 8, it is clear that the distribution of interest cover ratios is skewed. 
For  fms  with  positive  earnings,  interest  cover  is  bounded  between  zero  and 
infinity.  If profitable firms have little debt or if interest rates are low, their interest 
cover ratios will be high.  While most firms have interest cover ratios under 10, the 
interest cover of some firms exceeds 20.  Frequency histograms of the ratios in 1973 
and 1990 are shown in Graph 10.  I11  1973, oilly 17 percent of firms had an interest 
cover less than 3.  By 1990, this had increased to 46 percent of firms.  At the other 
tail of the distribution, there appears to be relatively little change; roughly the same 
number of firms had very high interest cover in  1990 as had high interest cover in 
1973. 
The variation  of the interest  cover ratios  over time is in rough  proportion  to  their 
absolute levels.  Because of the  skewness in  the  distribution  of the  ratios,  it  is 
difficult to detect important  economic  influences from the percentiles  in  Graph 8. 
To overcome this problem we also present the percentiles using a logaritlunic scale 
(Graph 11). 
In  Graph 11, it is  clear that the large decline  in  interest  cover between  1980 and 
1982 is common to all percentiles examined.  In contrast, subsequent variations are 
often peculiar to particular percentiles.  The 75th and 90th percentiles, representing 
firms  with  high  interest  cover,  showed slight  net  improvement  in  interest  cover 
between  1983 and 1990 while the lower percentiles continued to display increasing 
interest burdens.  Between  1987 and 1990, the 90th percentile  rose from  19.4 to 
22.7 wllile the 75th percentile rose from 7.9 to 10.0. Over the same period, the 50th 
and 25th percentiles fell to 3.9 and  1.9 from 4.6 and 2.4 respectively.  The 10th 
percentile fell from 1.3 to  1.1. 
These results are consistent with those for the debt-asset ratio.  They show that for 
almost all firms, the period from 1980 to  1987 was associated with declining interest 
cover,  After 1987, it was mainly those finns in the lower tail of the distribution that 
continued to experience deteriorating interest cover. Graph 10: Interest Cover Ratio (1973 and 1990) 




Graph 11: Interest Cover Ratio Percentiles 
(Logarithmic Scale) 3.3.  Dividend Pay-out Ratio 
Graph 12 shows the weighted average dividend pay-out ratio and Graph 13 presents 
the  percentiles  of  the  distribution  for  each  year.  Between  1973 and  1988, the 
weighted  average  dividend  pay-outs  oscillated  between  43 and  63 percent  of net 
profits and there was no evidence of either a positive or negative trend.  It does not 
appear that the desire to build up corporate balance sheets in the 1980s induced the 
majority of firms to increase their retained earnings as a percentage of net profits. 
After  1988, the  weighted  average  dividend  pay-out  ratio  increased  significantly, 
rising fiom 47 percent in  1988 to 76 percent in 1990.  Callen, Morling and Pleban 
(1992),  in a study of the behaviour of firm dividend policies, attribute much of this 
increase to changes in the taxation system.  These changes included the introduction 
of a capital gains tax in September 1985, the introduction of dividend imputation in 
July 1987 and the introduction of a 15 percent tax on the earnings of superannuation 
funds in July  1988.  Another major factor driving the increase in  the  payment  of 
dividends over the  late  1980s was the  rising  popularity  of dividend  reinvestment 
schemes wherein fms  could make the dividend payments desired by shareholders 
while  effectively  retaining  the  fiinds  for  fiiture  investment.  The  use  of  these 
schemes is also documented in Callen, Morling and Pleban (1 992). 
The  graphs  suggest  that  the  business  cycle  has  a  considerable  influence  on  the 
dividend pay-out  ratio.  Apart from the strong rise  at the end  of the sample, the 
largest increase in  the ratio occurred in  1983.  In this year,  the weighted  average 
pay-out ratio was 63 percent.  1983 was also the year in which the average return on 
fm  assets was at its lowest.  The increase in the pay-out ratio suggests that fms 
were unwilling to reduce the value of dividends in line with their lower profits.  This 
is  consistent  with  the  view  that  dividends  are  used  by  management  to  signal  to 
shareholders that the firm is basically sound.  By keeping dividends reasonably high 
when profits  are low,  management  signal  to the owners of  the  firms,  and  to  the 
firm's creditors, that the firm is expecting a recovery in its profitability.  As a result, 
the dividend pay-out ratio is counter-cyclical.  While the weighted average does not 
show an increase in the dividend pay-out  ratio  during slowdowns in  1974175 and 
1977178, the percentiles show that, in both periods, a reasonably wide cross section 
of fms  increased their pay-out ratios. 24 
Graph 12: Weighted Average Dividend Pay-out Ratio 
Graph 13: Dividend Pay-out Ratio Percentiles The percentiles show a wide dispersion in the dividend pay-out ratios across firms. 
In every year, at least 10 percent of firms have a pay-out ratio less than or equal to 
zerolo.  In contrast, the 90th percentile is greater than 70 percent in most years.  The 
increase in the pay-out ratio in 1983 appears to be a widespread feature as does the 
increase in 1989. It is also interesting to note that, over the 1980s, the dispersion of 
the ratios increased.  This increase largely reflects firms in the lower quartile of the 
distribution reducing their pay-out ratios;  in  1983, the 25th percentile was 0.40 but 
by 1988 it had fallen to 0.16. 
Graph 12 shows that the average dividend pay-out ratios increased rapidly in 1989 
and again to a lesser extent in  1990.  However, the percentiles in Graph 13 do not 
show the  1990 increase in  any of the percentiles.  The weighted  average between 
1989 and 1990 was driven by a small number of large firms that were making high 
losses,  In comparison, at a disaggregated level, 54 percent of firms increased their 
dividend  pay-out  ratios  in  1989  compared  to  only  40  percent  in  1990.  The 
remaining 60 percent of fms  drive the  1990 fall in the percentiles shown in Graph 
13. 
3.4.  Creditors to Debt Ratio 
Most sales by firms are credit sales.  A recent survey of manufactwing firms by the 
State Bank  of New  South Wales (1992)  reported  that  the  average proportion  of 
credit sales to total  sales was 88.9 percent.  Of the firms surveyed, 73.4 percent 
reported that the most common period over which credit was extended was 30 days 
while the average time taken to pay was 50.6 days.  This type of credit, whereby 
one firm  finances the purchases of its own output by  another firm,  constitutes  an 
important  component of the  total  debt of many  firms.  Unlike much  credit  from 
financial intermediaries, it is generally short-term and is not used to finance longer- 
term asset accumulation.  In thls section we look at the relative iinportance of this 
type of credit and at changes in its iinportance through time. 
If capital markets are perfect, firms should be indifferent between trade and bank 
credit.  Imperfections  in  capital  markets  often  remove  this  indifference.  In  their 
lo  Dividend pay-out  ratios can be negative if the firm  makes a loss after tax, interest  payments 
and depreciation.  These are treated as zero in the percentile graph of dividend pay-outs. survey of the  reasons  for  the  existence  of trade credit,  Schwartz and  Whitcomb 
(1979)  identify  two such imperfections.  The first  is the  existence  of  ceilings  on 
interest rates and the second is the fact that information is costly to collect and that 
the cost differs between providers of finance.  If there are ceilings on the interest 
rates which financial intermediaries can charge, and those ceilings are binding, then 
there must be disequilibrium credit rationing.  That is, some fms  that require funds 
will be unable to obtain them from a financial intermediary,  In such a situation, it 
may be optimal for suppliers to extend finance to buyers through trade credit.  This 
allows  the  buyer  to achieve  a  more  satisfactory level  of gearing  and  allows  the 
supplier to continue selling its product and, in so doing, earn a higher implicit rate of 
return  than  was  available  through  the  controlled  interest  rates  available  from 
financial intermediaries, 
In  many  cases,  information  concerning  the  creditworthiness  of  a  firm  can  be 
obtained with little cost to a firm's suppliers.  By obse~ng  the firm's orders and its 
payments  over  a  period  of  time,  the  suppliers  are  provided  with  considerable 
information  about the  firm.  Thus, suppliers may  have  a  lower cost  of  acquiring 
information concerning the firms to which they sell than do banks.  As a result, they 
may  be  able  to  provide  finance  to  the  firm  at  a  lower  cost  than  could  the 
intermediary.  While this explanatioil of trade credit is usefiil for explaining why the 
importance  of  trade  credit  differs  across  various  firm  types,  it  can  not  explain 
changes  over  time  unless  the  relative  information  costs  of  suppliers  and 
intermediaries are changing. 
The time profile of the weighted average ratio of trade credit to total debt is shown 
in Graph 14 and the  loth, 25t11,  50t11,  75th and  90th percentiles of the distribution 
are shown in  Graph  15.  The period  between  1973 and  1981 is characterised by 
trade credit accounting for an increasing share of corporate debt.  Over that period 
the average share rose from  19 percent to 26 percent.  Since  1981, however,  the 
trend has been reversed with the average share falling back to 21 percent by 1990. 
The percentiles show that the increase and then the fall in the share of trade credit is 
characteristic of a wide range of firms.  All percentiles were higher  in  1981 than 
they were in 1973 and were lower in 1990 than in 1973. Graph 15: Creditors-Debt Ratio Percentiles 
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Graph 14: Weighted Average Creditors-Debt Ratio 
0.3  0.3 
0.25  0.25 





1973  1975  1977  1979  1981  1983  1985  1987  1989 Much of this pattern in the ratio of creditors to total debt can be explained in terms 
of financial  regulation.  Up until  the  early  1980s, controls over the  interest rates 
charged by banks were a principal tool of monetary policy.  These controls had the 
effect  of limiting  the  growth  in  financial  intermediation.  The  slow  growth  in 
intermediated credit  before the  1980s can be  seen in Graph 16 which  shows the 
ratio of the combined  assets of all Australian  financial institutions  (excluding the 
Reserve Bank of Australia)  over nominal  GDP.  This ratio actually fell  between 
1973 and 1977, only reaching its 1973 level again in 1983.  With the limited growth 
of intermediation it is not surprising that trade credit became increasingly important 
over the 1970s and then declined in importance as financial markets were liberalised 
in the 1980s. 
Graph 15 shows that the importance of trade credit varies significantly across firms. 
In 1990, the 10th percentile was 7 percent while the 90th percentile was 44 percent. 
A large amount of this variation is accounted for by  industry-specific factors.  For 
example,  trade  credit  is  relatively  unimportant  for  mining  fms  and  relatively 
important for retail firms. This issue is discussed further in the following section. 
Graph 16: Assets of Financial Institutions Over GDP 4.  THE RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND 
THE CYCLICALITY OF OUTPUT AND EARNINGS 
The results in Section 3 indicate that the majority of fms  significantly altered their 
financial structure during the 1980s.  In this section, we explore the issue of whether 
changes  in  financial  structure  were  concentrated  in  particular  industries.  This 
section also discusses the relationship  between the evolution of various ratios and 
the  volatility/cyclicality of industry output and earnings.  Detailed  examination of 
the  relationship  between leverage and firm characteristics is undertaken  in Lowe, 
Morling and Shuetrim (1  993). 
Given expected returns, the risk that a firm is unable to meet its obligations out of 
current earnings increases with the extent of its leverage and with the volatility of its 
cash  flows.  As  a  result,  extremely  risk  averse  firms  are  likely  to  have  lower 
leverage, as are fms  with highly volatile or cyclically sensitive earnings.  If shocks 
to individual fms  are idiosyncratic (that is, if  the shocks are uncorrelated across 
fms)  then a widespread increase in leverage, similar to that which took place in the 
1980s, is unlikely to have important implications for the growth path of the macro- 
economy.  However,  in  many  cases, major  shocks  are highly  correlated  across 
fms.  For  example,  unexpectedly  tight  monetary  policy  is  likely  to  cause  a 
slowdown in economic activity and this slowdown is likely to reduce profits for a 
wide cross-section of firms.  If, as a result of the slowdown, firms wish to increase 
their interest cover and reduce their leverage, a period of low aggregate investment 
might  ensue  as  firms  become  less  able  to  undertake  additional  debt  financed 
investment.  This  would  imply  that  finns  are  foregoing  investment projects  with 
positive net present values.  The problem is potentially more severe if the increase in 
leverage is predominailtly concentrated in  finns with volatile or cyclically sensitive 
earnings.  On the other hand, firms whose  profits are relatively insensitive to the 
business  cycle are less likely to require balance sheet reconstruction following an 
adverse macro-economic shock. 
There is a growing literature on the links between the financial structure of firms and 
the evolution of the macro-economy.  This literature is discussed in  some detail in 
Lowe  and  Rohling  (1993).  They  identify  three  key  transmission  mechanisms 
through which the state of corporate balance sheets can affect the evolution of the 
business cycle.  The first is that emphasised by  Bernanke and Gertler (1990).  As a 
firm's  leverage  increases  and  the  probability  of  insolvency  rises,  financial intermediaries become less willing to lend to the firm, even if it  proposes a project 
with a positive net present value.  Second, if corporate insolvencies get translated 
into  the  balance  sheets  of  financial  institutions,  the  equity  of  those  financial 
institutions  is  reduced.  The  reduction  in  equity  may  result  in  the  financial 
institutions becoming less able to undertake risky lending.  Some form of lending 
institution induced credit squeeze may result.  Third, and perhaps most importantly, 
the incentives of managers are a function of the financial structure of the firm.  The 
higher  probability  of  financial  failure  may  reduce  the  incentives  for  risk-averse 
management, with fm-specific capital, to undertake further ex-ante profitable, but 
risky, investment. 
Recent research has examined the  link between  changes in  leverage and earnings 
volatility.  Seth ((1  990) and (1  99  1)) calculated  correlations between the degree of 
cyclicality in industry earnings and both the extent of industry leverage, and its rate 
of change, for a range of countries including Australia.  His results suggest that, in 
the United  States, increases in  leverage have been concentrated in  those industries 
with  cyclically  sensitive  earnings.  No such result  was found  for  Australia;  the 
average annual correlation between cyclicality and leverage being less than 0.1 over 
the sample period.  Seth found a similarly small average annual correlation between 
cyclicality  and the growth  rate of leverage in  Australia.  Seth also analysed the 
relationship  between  earnings  cyclicality  and  both  the  level  and  growth  rate  of 
interest  cover.  He concluded,  again  on  the  basis  of  annual  average  correlation 
coefficients, that there was no evidence that cyclically sensitive sectors in  Australia 
had either lower levels of interest cover or more rapid declines in interest cover. 
The conclusions reached by  Seth require some qualification.  His results are based 
on correlations between  the  average leverage of fms  in  each of the  10 industry 
groupings  and  the  degree  of  cyclicality  of  each  industry's  earnings.  Separate 
correlations  coefficients  between  industry  leverage  and  industry  cyclicality  are 
calculated  for  each of  10 years  and  the  correlations are then  averaged.  For the 
Australian firms, the correlation between leverage and cyclicality vary collsiderably 
over time; in 1983, the correlation was -0.81 while in  1987 it  was 0.39.  While the 
correlations are generally positive,  indicating that  industries with cyclical  earnings 
had higher leverage, the average correlation is essentially zero.  To a large extent 
this reflects the high negative correlation in  1983. Lee (1990)  also considered the relationslip between leverage and  cyclicality but 
concentrated his study on the United  States.  Again,  Lee classified  industries into 
cyclical and non-cyclical  groups based upon the correlation, within each industry, 
between fm  cash flow and the business cycle.  Median debt-asset ratios indicated 
that the leverage of firms in cyclical industries was marginally  lower than that of 
firms in the more stable industries.  Further, he found that the pattern was similar in 
1978 and in 1987 and that the relative debt-asset ratio rankings of industries with 
their cyclicality groupings were fairly stable over the time period studied. 
To explore the Australian experience more deeply, we compare various measures of 
industry cyclicality and industry volatility to weighted  average and median industry 
fmancial ratios.  We begin  by  classifLing the  firms  in our database into  industry 
groups.  The  choice  of  industries  is  restricted  to  the  intersection  of  industry 
classifications in our database and those in the National Accounts data.  These are 
the manufacturing, mining, wholesale trade, retail trade and service sectors.  Most 
firms are classified into one of these five industry groupings.  Given that many fms 
are highly diversified, the classifications are far fiom perfect.  Of the 110 fms,  five 
were excluded from the analysis as we felt that they could not sensibly be put into 
any category.  The classifications are given in Appendix  1. 
Having classified each firm into one of the five industry groups, we then examine 
the  degree  of volatility  and  cyclicality  of industry  earnings and  output.  Industry 
output  is derived  fiom the National  Accounts  data and  average earnings is based 
upon  each  individual  firm's  financial  statements.  Finally,  we  examine  the 
relationship  between  changes  in  leverage,  interest  cover  and  the  ratio  of  trade 
creditors to debt for each of the industry groups and the volatilitylcyclicality  of the 
industries' earningsloutput. 
Various methods are used to construct measures of cyclicality and volatility.  The 
simplest measure of volatility is the standard deviation of the growth rate of industry 
output.  This is calculated using the percentage  change in  quarterly industry GDP 
measured  at  1984185 prices.  These  standard  deviations  are  shown  in  the  first 
column of Table 1.  Table  1 also contains the coefficient of variation (the standard 
deviation  divided  by  the  mean).  Higher  volatility  of  industry  output  does  not 
necessarily imply  a  greater  riskiness  if  the  average  growth  rates  of firms  in  the 
industry  are also higher.  The coefficieilt  of variation  attempts to  control  for the 
different rates of growth experienced in various industries between 1973 and 1990. Both  the  standard  deviation and  the  coefficient of variation  are measures  of the 
volatility of industry output.  It  is  also interesting to  examine .the extent to which 
industry output and profitability vary with the business cycle.  The fust method used 
to  obtain  a  measure  of  industry  cyclicality  involves  regressing  the  quarterly 
percentage change in real industry GDP on a constant and the quarterly percentage 
change in total GDPl I. 
If  changes  in  total  GDP  are  uncorrelated  with  changes  in  industry  GDP,  the 
coefficient  on  total  GDP  (P)  will  be  zero.  Typically,  those  industries  with 
coefficients greater than  one are  said  to  be  cyclically  sensitive while  those  with 
coefficients less than one are said not to be cyclically sensitive.  This distinction is 
somewhat  arbitrary in that  it  is made  relative to  the  normal  level  of  cyclicality 
defined by the percentage changes in total GDP. 
A  second  measure  of  cyclicality  can  be  obtained  by  calculating  the  correlation 
coefficients (p)  between changes in  industry output and  changes  in GDP.  These 
correlation coefficients equal P multiplied by  the ratio of the standard deviation of 
the total GDP growth rate over the standard deviation of the industry output growth 
rate.  Both  the  estimates  of  P  and  p  are  presented  in  Table  2  along with  their 
standard errors. 
A similar method is used to gauge eanlings cyclicality,  This measure is estimated 
by regressing the industry rate of return on  a constant and the gap between actual 
output and potential output. 
75  -  =  a  +  r GAPtotal  +  E 
A industry 
11  Both the industry aggregate and  total  aggregate measures of GDP  are seasonally adjusted 
series measured at constant prices from the Australian National Accounts, catalogues 5206.0  and 
5222.0. The industry rate of return is based upon an individual firm's financial statementslz. 
Potential output is estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott (1980) filter which generates 
a  non-linear  trend  from  the  actual  GDP  seriesl3.  The  Hodrick-Prescott  filter 
minimises a function of the sum of squared deviations of the trend value fiom the 
logarithm of actual GDP and  a penalised  sum of the  squared  cl~anges  in  trend  in 
each quarter.  Again, the size of the coefficient on the GAP variable is an indication 
of the cyclicality of an industry's average rate of return.  Industries whose rates of 
return  on  assets vary substantially with the business  cycle should generate higher 
estimates of y than should industries whose profitability is largely independent of the 
business cycle.  The estimated coefficients are reported in the third column of Table 
2 along with their standard errorsl4. 
The results in Table  1 show that  the standard  deviation of  the growth rate  of the 
output of the mining industry is considerably higher than the standard deviation for 
the  other  sectors.  On  the  basis  of  the  standard  deviation  measure  of  volatility, 
wholesale and manufach~ring  are the next two most volatile sectors, followed by the 
retail  sector  and  finally,  the  service  sector.  Using  the  coefficient  of  variation 
measure, manufacturing has  the highest measure of  volatility with a coefficient of 
10.6 followed by  wholesale trade with  a coefficient of  7.2  and  mining with 4.2. 
Retail  trade and  service are considerably more stable with coefficients of 3.0 and 
1.6 respectively.  It should be noted that the relative ranking of the mining industry 
alters between measures.  During the period fi-om  1973 to  1990, the output of the 
mining  industry  grew  much  more  rapidly  than  that  of  the  manufacturing  and 
12  A weighted  average measure of firms' rates of return  was used  for each industry.  This was 
calculated  as the sum of net  profits across the firms in  an industry divided by  the sum of total 
assets across the same group of firms. 
l3  The Hodrick-Prescott procedure was run  with the non-linearity  penalty parameter  (h) set at 
1600, the value favoured by Kydland  and Prescott (1990).  The original data series is quarterly 
real GDP with 1987 as the base year and runs from March  1964 to December 1991.  To generate 
annual  observations,  a weighted  average  of the observed  quarterly gaps  over  eight  quarters is 
used.  The eight quarters capture all  possible observations relating  to the financial statements  in 
one year and the weights reflect the fraction of financial statements reported in  each quarter. 
'4  Note that  the standard  errors of the  estimated  y  coefficients are  not  directly  comparable 
between industry equations in  this table.  This reflects the fact that, when averaging the data over 
an  increasing  number  of firms,  that  part  of the  variance  caused  by  variability in  firm  specific 
factors becomes increasingly small.  Those industries with a large number of firms would, thus, be 
expected to exhibit a smaller total error variance. wholesale sectors.  As a result, the coefficient of variation of the growth rate of the 
mining sector is less than that of the manufacturing and wholesale sectors. 
Given our definition of a cyclical industry, the measure of cyclicality obtained from 
estimating equation (5) shows that the mining, manufacturing and wholesale sectors 
are  cyclical  while  the  retail  and  service  sectors  are  relatively  insensitive  to  the 
business cycle.  The retail industry appears to exhibit the least degree of cyclicality, 
followed by the service industry, both of which have coefficients significantly less 
than one.  Manufacturing and wholesale trade, on the other hand, are clearly cyclical 
with  coefficients  significantly  greater than one.  The coefficient  on mining  is  also 
greater than one but not significanily sols.  The correlation coefficients show broadly 
similar rankings except that the mining sector appears much less cyclical than the 
results in column one of Table 2 suggest.  This reflects the relatively large standard 
deviation of the growth rate of the mining sector. 
The regressions of industry  return  on the output  gap yielded  relatively  imprecise 
estimates of the degree of cyclicality.  Of the five parameters  estimated, only the 
coefficients in the equation for the manufacturing and retail sectors are significantly 
different  from  zero  at  the  5  percent  level  of  significance.  The  service  industry 
coefficient is actually negative unlike  those of the other industries.  However, the 
insignificance of the service industry coefficient prevents any special interpretation 
of the result. 
The above results suggest the following conclusions.  Both the retail and the service 
sectors have output that is relatively stable and both sectors are relatively insulated 
from  the business cycle.  In  contrast, output of the  manufacturing  and wholesale 
sectors is relatively volatile and influenced more heavily by the business cycle.  The 
mining  sector has  the  most  volatile  output  but  the  volatility  in  its  output  is  less 
directly associated with the business cycle than is the case for the manufacturing or 
wholesale industries. 
15  All significance tests are done at  the five percent level using a one tailed test. Table 1: Industry Measures Of Volatility 
Table 2: Industry Measures Of Cyclicality 
1. Quarterly growth rates have been used in both Tables 1 and 2. 
2. Numbers given in parentheses are standard errors.  They are estimated using the 
Newey-West procedure.  Only one lag is used in the constniction of the variance 
covariance matrix. 
3. p: the coefficient on the percentage change in total GDP for each industry. (See 
Equation 5) 
4. p: the correlation coefficient between the percentage change in total GDP and the 
percentage change in GDP for each industry. 
5. y: the coefficient on the GDP gap variable explaining the industry rates of return 
on total assets. (See Equation 6) 36 
Table 3: Weighted Average Industry Debt-Asset Ratios 
Table 4: Median Industry Debt-Asset Ratios 
Table 5: Weighted Average Industry Interest Cover Ratios 37 
Table 6: Median Industry Interest Cover Ratios 
Table 7: Weighted Average Industry Creditors To Debt Ratios 
Table 8: Median Industry Creditors To Debt Ratios The ranking of the five industry groups can be compared to the industry debt-asset, 
interest cover and creditors to debt ratios to determine whether the finns in  the more 
cyclical  and  the  more  volatile  industries  have  lower leverage  and have  exhibited 
more  restraint  in  their  debt  expansion.  The  dividend  pay-out  ratio  was  also 
considered but no substantial industry specific effects were detected.  To allow an 
examination  of  the  relationship  between  cyclicality/volatility  and  the  levels  and 
changes in  the  various  ratios  over time,  the  weighted  averages and medians,  by 
ratio, for each of the five industries are presented in Tables 3 through 8. 
Of the relatively volatile industries, manufacturing is clearly the one that has made 
the most significant changes to its financial stnicture over the  1980s.  The results in 
Table 3 show that the weighted average debt-asset ratio for manufacturing increased 
fiom 0.46 in 1973 to 0.61 in  1990.  The median debt-asset ratio for manufacturing in 
Table 4 shows a similar rise. 
Associated with the increase in leverage of manufacturing was a pronounced decline 
in  interest cover.  The weighted  average interest cover (Table 5) fell fiom 8.9 in 
1973 to  3.6 in  1990 while the median interest cover (Table 6) fell fiom 9.9 to 4.0 
over the same period.  Although most of the financial structure adjustment may have 
reflected a movement fiom a constrained position to  an unconstrained position, the 
severity of the adjustment in  the manufacturing sector suggests that some firms may 
have increased their leverage excessively, 
The weighted  average  debt-asset  ratio  for mining  actually fell between  1973 and 
1990 after a brief increase in the mid 1980s.  However, this fall is mainly associated 
with a single firm that had total assets greater than the sum of total assets across all 
other mining firms.  Given the dominance of the single firm, the median  debt-asset 
ratio may provide a  accurate picture of the industry as a whole.  The median 
figures show considerable volatility, increasing significantly between 1973 and 1975 
before falling in the early 1980s and then increasing again through the remainder of 
the decade.  The low figure for 1980 (both the median and the weighted average) 
reflects the equity raisings associated with the increase in  investment in the mining 
sector in the early 1980s. 
As is the case for the debt-asset ratio, the interest cover ratio for the mining sector is 
volatile.  Although  it  appears  that  interest  cover  in  the  mining  sector  has  not 
experienced the same sustained decline as in other sectors, the mining boom in  1980 raised the median interest cover to 12.4.  The 1982183 recession, however, caused it 
to fall to a low of 5.36.  By 1990 interest cover had  recovered to be similar to the 
cover experienced during the fust half of the 1970s. 
The results in Tables 7 and 8 show that, of the five sectors examined, the mining 
sector has made the least use of trade credit.  In 1990, such credit accounted for less 
than  10 percent  of total  debt  in  the mining  industry.  However,  like  the  other 
industry groups, the reliance on trade credit did increase over the  1970s and then 
fell over the 1980s. 
The results  for the wholesale  sector need  to  be  interpreted  with  some caution. 
Although the wholesale firms faced the highest leverage and lowest interest cover 
during most of the sample period, it is difficult to compare these results with those 
of other  industries  because  thee of the  six  wholesale  firms  in  our  sample  are 
subsidiaries of Japanese multinationals.  The consolidated risk position of the parent 
company  and  its  subsidiaries  should  be  considered  rather  than  the  individual 
accounts of the subsidiary.  Thus, the high leverage and low interest cover of the 
wholesale  industry  may  not  be  representative  of  the  subsidiaries'  true  financial 
security. 
Traditionally, the retail sector has been more highly geared than the manufacturing 
sector.  However, the increase in leverage in  the  nlanufacturing sector during the 
1980s has meant that, more recently, the two industry groupings have been similarly 
geared.  Over the sample period, the weighted  average debt-asset ratio of firms in 
the  retail  sector increased  froin  0.50 to 0.60 while  the weighted  average interest 
cover ratio fell from 10.9 to 3.5.  The results in Tables 7 and 8 also show that the 
retail  firms  have typically  been  heavy  users  of trade  credit.  In  1980, creditors 
accounted for 46 percent of the total debt of the retail finns.  This share had fallen to 
29 percent by  1990. The results also show that between  1980 and 1990, there was 
little  change in  the  gearing  of the  retail  industry.  This  may  have  reflected  the 
changrng composition of total debt away fioin trade creditors towards other forms of 
debt. 
Table 3  shows that  the weighted  average debt-asset ratio for the service industry 
increased marginally from 0.64 to 0.67 over the period.  A possible reason for the 
limited  expansion  of debt  by  the service sector  is  the  fact  that  its  leverage was 
already high  in comparison to the other industries.  Acco~npanying  the relatively minor  debt  expansion  that  occurred  between  1973  and  1990  were  significant 
declines in the weighted average and median interest cover ratios fi-om 6.6 to 2.9 
and  fi-om  9.6  to  3.6  respectively.  The  declines  primarily  reflect  a  substantial 
increase in the average interest rate paid.  There was also a slight decline in the ratio 
of earnings to total assets. 
Of the  five  industry  groups  considered  in  this  section,  developments  in  the 
manufacturing  sector  are  of  potential  concern.  The  evidence  suggests  that  the 
increases in leverage and the decline in interest cover were very pronounced for the 
manufacturing  sector.  The manufacturing  sector  also  appears to  have  the  most 
cyclically-sensitive output16.  A significant increase in leverage within  a cyclically- 
sensitive  sector is  exactly  the  situation  in  which  increasing  average leverage  is 
likely to affect the evolution of the macro-economy,  An adverse shock to demand 
places the highly  geared firms under considerable financial distress.  This distress 
may well  lead  to  a period  of  relatively  low investment  as companies  attempt  to 
retain  earnings  in  an  effort  to  improve  their  financial  structure.  The  likely 
consequence is a slower recovery fi-om an adverse macro-economic shock.  This is 
not to say that high debt is the only factor that can slow investment recovery,  Most 
notably, excess capacity and slack demand, by reducing the number of investment 
projects  with  positive  net  present  value,  will  also  reduce  the  level  of  corporate 
investment. 
5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The fmancial liberalisation of the 1980s eliminated the need for disequilibrium credit 
rationing in Australian financial markets.  This permitted  a wide range of firms to 
enjoy greater access to borrowed hnds intermediated by the finance sector.  In  the 
newly liberalised  and competitive financial  markets,  lending institutions  competed 
aggressively for market  share.  This drive  for  market  share was reflected  in  an 
enthusiasm to lend and a relaxation  of credit  control standards.  The result was a 
rapid  increase  in  aggregate credit  extended  by  financial  institutions.  During the 
l6  The internationalisation  of the  Australian  manufacturing  sector  may  well  have  made  the 
industry, as a whole, less sensitive to the Australian business cycle in  recent years.  In this case, 
the measured cyclicality of the manufacturing sector may overstate the actual degree of  cyclicality 
in recent years. period from 1983 to  1990, credit  increased  at an  average rate of  18 percent  per 
annuml7.  This rapid  growth in  credit was reflected  in  corporate balance sheets. 
During  the  1980s  the  real  size  of  corporate  balance  sheets  increased  at  a 
considerably  faster  pace  than  in  the  1970s and  the  proportion  of  total  assets 
fmanced by debt increased markedly. 
The results reported in Section 3 of this paper indicate that, through the 1970s, total 
debt accounted for an average of just over of 50 percent of total assets of the firms 
in our sample.  By 1990, tlis share had increased to around 66 percent.  The results 
also suggest that the increase in leverage was characteristic of a wide range of fms 
rather than being confmed to a small number of firms.  After 1987, while most fms 
reduced their leverage,  average gearing continued to  rise.  This reflected  the fact 
that, in the late 1980s, a number of firms that were already highly leveraged, fiirther 
increased their debt-asset ratios. 
Associated  with  the increased gearing of the  1980s was  a  significant  decline  in 
interest cover.  During the  1982183 recession,  interest cover fell  in  line  with the 
reduction in fm  profits and the rise in  interest rates.  As the economy recovered 
from the recession, firms began to finance asset expansion primarily through debt. 
Thus, even though earnings increased and interest rates initially fell, interest cover 
did not return to the levels of the 1970s. 
The paper also suggests that the constraints on the fmancial system, which were in 
place in the  1970s, led to firms becoining increasingly dependent upon trade credit 
as a source of finance.  The liberalisation of financial markets over the  1980s has 
reduced the importance of this type of credit.  However, given the lower transaction 
costs and the iilfonnation advantage that suppliers of trade credit often hold  over 
financial institutions,  trade  credit  should  remain  an  i~nportant  fi~nding  source for 
many fms. 
Section 4  of the paper indicated that the increase in leverage that occurred in  the 
1980s was characteristic of a range of different industry groups.  The increase was 
relatively large in the manufachlring sector.  Manufacturing is also the  sector with 
the most cyclically sensitive output.  The combination of cyclically-sensitive output 
l7  Based upon Table 3.2 in  Occasional Paper No. 8 published by the Reserve Bank of Australia. and  significant increases it1 leverage (and declines in  interest cover) increased the 
probability that fms  would  be unable to meet current  obligations out  of cunent 
earnings following an adverse macro-economic shock.  In a world characterised by 
full information and appropriate financial contracts, this would not necessarily imply 
an  increased probability of financial distress or firm  failure.  However, we do not 
live in such a world.  The increased probability of financial distress occasioned by 
higher  leverage  and  an  adverse shock to  demand,  is  likely to  have  changed the 
incentives  for  management  to  undertake  risky  investment  and  for  financial 
intermediaries to finance such investment.  In turn, these changes are likely to have 
altered the evolution of the business cycle.  This is a topic for further research. APPENDIX 1: DATA 
The database used in this study consists of 224 firms.  There are both listed and 
unlisted fms  in the sample; however, no fillancia1 institutions have been included 
because of their different balance sheet structures.  Of the 114 firms that do not have 
complete data series, 22 firms do not have data until in  1973 and 104 firms ceased 
to have data available prior to 1990. The firms that left the sample prior to 1990 did 
so for a variety of reasons.  Some were taken over or merged with other companies 
thereby losing their identity in the parent company.  These fms  continued operating 
but  did  not  generate  separate financial statements  and  thus  had  to  be  excluded. 
Others left the sample because of finailcia1 distress.  A full listing of the companies 
in the database is given below.  Those with an asterisk do not have complete data 
for the entire sample period. 
Conglomerates 
Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd  Industrial Equity Ltd* 
Australian Consolidated Investments  Parry Corporation Ltd* 
Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd  WR Carpenter Holdings Pty Ltd* 




Ashton Mining Ltd* 
Austen & Butta Ltd* 
Australian Oil & Gas Corporation Ltd* 
Bridge Oil Ltd* 
Clutha Ltd 
Coal & Allied Industries Ltd* 




Genoa Resources & Investment Ltd* 
Gove Aluminium Ltd 
Griffin Coal Mining Co Pty Ltd* 
Hartogen Energy Ltd* 
MIIvi Holdings Ltd 
Newcrest Mining Ltd* 
North Broken Hill Peko Ltd 
Oakbridge Ltd* 
Offshore Oil  N L 
Pancontinental Mining Ltd 
Peko Wallsend Ltd* 
Pilbara Iron Ltd 
Placer Pacific Ltd* 
Queensland Mines Ltd* 
Renison Goldfields Consolidated Ltd 
Santos Ltd 
Shell Development (Australia) Ltd* 
Swiss Aluminium Australia Ltd* 
The Moonie Oil  Co Ltd* 
Thiess Bros Pty Ltd 
Thiess Dampier Mitsui Coal Pty Ltd* 
Ulan Coal Mines Ltd* 
Utah Mining Australia Ltd* 
Vamgas Ltd 
Western Mining Corporation Holdings Ltd 
White Industries Australia Ltd* 
Woodside Petroleum Ltd Manufacturing 
ACI International Ltd* 
Adelaide Brighton Cement Holdings Ltd 
Advertiser Newspapers Ltd * 
Alcan Australia Ltd 
Alcoa of Australia Ltd 
Altona Petrochemical Co Ltd* 
Amcor Ltd 
AMI Toyota Ltd* 
Arnotts Ltd 
Associated Pulp & Paper Mills* 
Australian Chemical Holdings Ltd 
Australian National Industries Ltd 
Australian Newsprint Mills Ltd* 
AWA Ltd 
Beatrice Australia Ltd* 
Blue Circle Southern Cement Ltd* 
Bonds Industries Ltd* 
Boral Ltd 
Borg Warner (Australia) Ltd* 
Bowater Corporation of Australia Ltd* 
Bowater Industries Australia Ltd* 
BP Australia Ltd 
Brick & Pipe Industries Ltd* 
Brickworks Ltd 
Bridgestone Australia Ltd 
BTR Nylex Ltd 
Bundaberg Sugar Co Ltd 
Bunnings Ltd 
Bushells Holdings Ltd* 
Cadbury Schweppes Australia Ltd* 
Caltex Australia Ltd 
Carlton & United Breweries Ltd* 
Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd* 
Caterpillar of Australia Ltd* 
Chamberlain Holdings Ltd* 
Cheetham Salt Ltd* 
Ciba-Geigy Australia Ltd 
Clyde Industries Ltd 
Coca-Cola Amatil Ltd 
Comalco Ltd 
Commonwealth Industrial Gases Ltd* 
Consolidated Press Holdings Ltd Group* 
CSBP & Farmers Ltd* 
CSR Ltd 
Dow Chemical (Aust) Ltd 
Dupont Australia Ltd* 
EFFEM Foods Pty Ltd* 
Email Ltd 
EPT Group Holdings Ltd* 
Ericsson Australia* 
Esso Australia Ltd 
F H Faulding & Co Ltd 
Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd 
G E Crane Holdings Ltd 
GEC Australia Ltd 
General Motors-Holden's Automotive Ltd * 
George Weston Foods Ltd 
Gibson Chemical Industries Ltd 
Goodman Fielder Wattie Ltd 
Goodyear Australia Ltd* 
Hawker de Havilland Ltd 
Hills Industries Ltd 
HJ Heinz Co Aust Ltd 
Hoechst Australia Ltd* 
Humes Ltd* 
Hunter Douglas Australia Ltd 
ICI Australia Ltd 
J Gadsden Australia Ltd* 
James Hardie Industries Ltd 
Jl Case (Australia) Pty Ltd* 
John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd* 
Johnson & Johnson Australia Pty Ltd* 
JRA Ltd* 
Kellogg (Aust) Pty Ltd* 
Kimberly Clark Australia Pty Ltd 
Kodak (Australasia) Pty Ltd* 
Kraft Foods Ltd* 
McPherson's Ltd 
Metal Manufactures Ltd 
Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd 
Mobil Oil Australia Ltd 
Monier PGH Ltd* 
Monsanto Australia Ltd* 
National Can Industries Ltd* 
National Consolidated Ltd 
NEC Australia Pty Ltd* 
Nestle Australia Ltd 
Nicholas Kiwi Ltd* 
Nissan Motor Manufacturing Co (Aust) Ltd 
Nucleus Ltd* Nylex Corporation Ltd* 
OPSM Pty Ltd 
Pacific Dunlop Ltd 
Petersville Sleigh Ltd* 
Phillip Moms (Australia) Ltd* 
Phillips Industries Holdings Ltd* 
Pilkington (Australia) Ltd 
Pioneer International Ltd 
Pioneer Sugar Mills Ltd* 
Queensland Alumina Ltd* 
Queensland Cement Ltd* 
Queensland Press Ltd* 
QUF Industries Ltd 
Reckitt & Coleman Australia Ltd* 
Repco* 
Rothmans Holdings Ltd 
SA Brewing Holdings Ltd 
Shell Australia Ltd 
Brash Holdings Ltd 
Coles Myer Ltd 
David Jones Ltd 
Fujitsu Australia Ltd 
Hastings Deering Corporation Ltd 
IBM Australia Ltd 
John Martin Retailers Ltd* 
Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) 
Pty Ltd 
Austmark International Ltd* 
Brambles Industries Ltd 
Costain Australia Ltd* 
Eastwest Airlines Ltd* 
ENT Ltd 
Entrad Corporation Ltd* 
Howard Smith Ltd 
Hoyts Entertainment Ltd 
Jennings Group Ltd 
John Holland Group Pty Ltd* 
Kern Corporation Ltd 
L J Hooker Australia Ltd* 
Siemens Ltd* 
Softwood Holdings Ltd* 
Sperry Ltd* 
Standard Telephones & Cables Pty Ltd* 
Textron Pacific Ltd* 
The Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd 
The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd* 
The News Corporation Ltd 
Thorn EMI (Australia) Ltd* 
Tooth & Co Ltd 
Toyota Motor Corporation Australia Ltd 
Tubemakers of Australia Ltd 
Unilever Australia Ltd* 
Union Carbide Australia & New Zealand 
Ltd* 
Wattyl Ltd 
Wormald Australia Pty Ltd 
Retail 
LNC Industries Pty Ltd* 
Nissan Motor Co (Aust) Pty Ltd 
The Myer Emporium Ltd* 
Waltons Bond Ltd* 
Wang Australia Pty Ltd* 
Woolworths Ltd* 
Service 
Latec Investments Ltd 
Leighton Holdings Ltd 
Lend Lease Corporation Ltd 
Mayne Nickless Ltd 
McIlwraith McEacharn Ltd 
P & 0 Australia Ltd* 
SAGASCO Holdings Ltd* 
Spotless Group Ltd 
TAL Holdings Ltd* 
The Australian Gas Light Company 
The Greater Union Organisation Pty Ltd* 
TNT Ltd 
Westfield Holdings Ltd* 46 
Wholesale 
Bums Philp & Company Ltd 
C Itoh & Co (Aust) Ltd 
Charles Davis Ltd 
Edwards Dunlop & Co Ltd* 
Gordon and Gotch Ltd* 
Great Western Australia Ltd* 
Honda Australia Pty Ltd* 
Honeywell Holdings Pty Ltd * 
Marubeni Australia Ltd 
Mazda Australia Pty Ltd* 
Mercedes Benz (Australia) Pty Ltd* 
Mitsui & Co (Australia) Ltd 
Southern Farmers Group Ltd* 
Toyota Motor Sales Australia Ltd* 
Volvo Australia Pty Ltd* 
Washington H Soul Pattinson & Co Ltd 
Aggregate  and  industry  Gross  Domestic  Product  figures  were  taken  fiom  the 
Australian  Bureau  of  Statistics  publications  catalogues  5206.0  and  5222.0 
respectively.  They run from the third quarter in  1974 through to the first quarter in 
1992.  Minmg, manufacturing, wholesale  and  retail  trade  are taken  directly from 
5222.0 while service output is approximated by the aggregation of the transport and 
storage,  the  communication  and  the  finance,  property  and  business  services 
industries. 
Nominal total Gross Domestic Product and the Net Operating Surplus of corporate 
trading  enterprises  (including  public  trading  enterprises)  was  obtained  from 
catalogue 5204.0 published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
The total assets of private corporate trading enterprises in  1990 was obtained fiom 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics, catalogue 5232.0. 
The Overdraft interest rate in  Graph 7 was extracted Table F.3 in  the Reserve Bank 
of Australia Bulletin series.  It is the minimum of a range of indicator rates reported 
by major Australian banks. 
The total assets of financial  institutions, excluding the Reserve Bank of Australia, 
were  obtained  fiom  Table  3.4A  of  Occasional  Paper  No.  8,  published  by  the 
Reserve Bank in 1990. APPENDIX 2: SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS 
The graphs presented in the paper are based on a balanced data set of 110 firms.  A 
balanced or constant sample of firms was chosen so that changes in the ratios were 
not induced by changes in the basket  of firms being measured.  However, using a 
balanced sample introduces a potential selection bias.  Firms that fail are typically 
highly geared and have low interest cover.  Thus, if firms leave ,the sample, due to 
failure,  the  average  debt-asset  ratio  of  the  balanced  sample  of  firms is  likely to 
underestimate  the  actual  debt-asset  ratio  of  all  firms  that  were  operating  at  a 
particular point in time.  Alternatively, firms may leave the sample by being taken- 
over by  another  company.  Firms that  are taken-over  often  have  relatively  low 
gearing.  Thus, if take-overs represent the principal form of attrition, the  constant 
sample of fms  may overestimate the actual debt-asset ratio of all firms operating at 
a particular point in time. 
This  appendix  examines  the  difference  between  the  ratios  obtained  fiom  the 
balanced sample of 110 firms and the ratios obtained fiom the larger but unbalanced 
sample.  For  this  purpose  the  weighted  averages  from  both  the  balanced  and 
unbalanced  samples  are  presented  in  Graphs A1  through  A4.  The  unbalanced 
sample consists of up to 224 firms. 
The qualitative conclusions from the unbalanced sample match those reported in this 
paper.  The  differences  between  the  ratios  generated  by  the  two  samples  are 
insignificant relative to the changes in leverage that were occurring over the sample 
period.  Given  that  the  graphs  generated  fiom  either  sample  yield  the  same 
qualitative conclusions, we are satisfied with reporting the results for the balanced 
sample only. Graph Al:  Debt-Asset Ratio: Sample Comparison 
-  Unbalanced  '--  Balanced 
Graph A2:  Interest Cover Ratio: Sample Comparison 
8  8 
/---*\  -  Unbalanced ------ Balanced 49 
Graph A3: Dividend Pay-Out Ratio: Sample Comparison 
-  Unbalanced -  Balanced 
Graph A4: Creditors-Debt Ratio: Sample Comparison 
0.3  0.3 
-  Unbalanced  -----  -- Bnlanced 
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